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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
lrr~\H PARI(S C((\IP.A.XY, a Cor-
poration, 
Pia inti ff -Appellant, 
Y~. 
IROl\ C01;~'1,\'", a Body Corpor.ate 
and Politi<·, and CEDAR CITY 







This is a ~nit pursuant to ~ection 59-10-1-±, lTtah 
Code Annotated, 193:~, for a refund of property taxes 
illegally collectP< l fron1 plaintiff by Iron County; or in 
the alternative, a reimbur~e1nent to plaintiff of said tax 
payment from (;edar C1ity Corporation, pursuant to a 
provision in a "~arrant~~ deed wherein plaintiff trans-
ferred the El Esc.alante Hotel and underlying realty at 
Cedar City, lTtah, to C1edar City Corporation, which 
deed provided that (~edar City 'vould assume and pay all 
taxes la ,yfully levied upon or assessed against said 
premises. 
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DISPO~SITION" IN LOWER COl~RT 
The court granted Iron County's motion to dis1niss 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted .and a\varded a judg1nent of dismissal in favor of 
Cedar City Corporation on an agreed state1nent of facts. 
Plaintiff appeals from both judg1nents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 0~,~ APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judg1nent of dis-
missal in favor of Iron County and a judgment in its 
favor .as a matter of la.\v, or that failing, a reinstaten1ent 
of its con1plaint against Iron County in the trial court 
for further proceedings; or in the alternative, a reversal 
of the judgment of disn1i~~al in favor of Cedar City 
Corporation .and judgment in favor of plaintiff as a 
matter of law. 
PRELI~IIN.l~RY ST.A.TE:\IEXT 
The brief of appellant covers both Case X o. 9540 
and Case No. 9753. \\~en this la-\vsuit \\·as initially filed 
in the trial court it included both respondent parties as 
defendants and relief \Vas sought against said defendants 
in the alternative, the causes of action .against each being 
n1utually exelusive. The action against Iron County \vas 
concluded in the trial court approxin1ately one year be-
fore the .artion \Vas coneluded against Cedar City Cor-
poration. As a rPsult, t"·o separatt• appeals bec.ame 
n<)ePssary, and upon perfeetion of the second appeal, an 
order of consolidation "~.as entered in this court. In the 
Staten1ent of Faets, nonP of \\Thich \\Tere in issue, the 
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3 
<·itations to th0 t"·o records \Vill be distinguished by 
plaeing an a.~teri~k follo\\"ing the record citations from 
Case No. 97;)3 involving Cedar C~ity Corporation. 
STATEMENT· OF FACTS 
J>laintiff is a Utah corp·oration, Iron County, a body 
corporate and politic and a politieal subdivision of the 
State of lTtah, and (~edar City Corporat~on is a municipal 
corporation organized and existing by virtue of the· laws 
of the State of Utah. All three entities were duly con-
stitute·d as such during all times mentioned herein. On 
January 1, 1958, plaintiff was the record and actual 
owner of t~he El Escalante Hotel, together with all furn-
iture and fixtures and underlying realty, at Cedar City, 
Iron County, State of lTtah. On January 31st of that year, 
and prior to the t~'{ levy for the ye.ar 1958, plaintiff trans-
ferred and eonveyed title to said hotel, furnishings and 
underlying realty, by ''·"arranty deed to defendant, Cedar 
City Corporation, a rnunicipality exempt from taxation 
pursuant to thP lTtah State Constitution. (R. 1) and 
(R. 21)* 
The \Y.arranty deed transferred title to the hotel 
and underlying realty to Cedar City Corporation free 
of all liens and encurnbrances, except as specifically 
contained therein, and Cedar City Corporation .also ac-
cepted said property subject to the following covenant: 
"'All taxes and all assessinents, general and 
special, .and all installments of assessments law-
fully levied upon or assessed against the premies 
hereinbefore described which become due and p·ay-
able subsequent to the date hereof, which taxes 
and assessments the grantee (Cedar City Cor-
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4 
por.ation) hereby assu1nes and agrees to pay." 
(R. 2) (R. 12-15, 21)~ 
As the record owner of said hotel and underlying 
realty on January 1, 1958, the .ad valoren1 tax assess-
ment and levy for that year was made and processed 
in the naine of plaintiff, and plaintiff .also received the 
valuation and tax notices on ~aid property. The total 
assessed valuation for the year 1958 on the El Escalante 
Hotel building, the underlying realty and the furniture 
and fixtures, \vas $110,670. That valuation \vas subjected 
to a 64 1nill levy, making the t.ax for the year 1958 the 
sum of $7 ,082.88. On or about ~ ovember 26, 1958, plain-
tiff paid the Iron County Treasurer, without protest, 
the 1958 taxes assessed and levied against said prope·rty 
in the total sum of $7,082.88. (R. 2) (R. 11, 22) * 
Thereafter, and based upon C1edar City Corpora-
tion's covenant and obligation under the \Varranty deed 
to pay all taxes and a~~sessn1ents la\Yfully levied or as-
sessed against said pre1nisr~ \Yhich hecan1e due and 
payable subsequent to ,January 31, 1958, plaintiff re-
quested reimburse1nent of ~aid tax pay1nent fro1n Cedar 
City Corporation. By letter dated X ove1nber 11, 1959, 
(~edar City c·orporation adYi~t>d plaintiff that it refused 
to 1nake ~uc:h rein1burse1nent. (R. 16, 22) * 
Plaintiff .also 1nade \Yritten application for a refund 
of said taxe~ to the Board of County Connnissioners of 
Iron Count)· on or about July 30, 1959, acting pursuant 
to Seetion 59-10-14, 1:tah Code .A.nnotated, 1953, which 
provides in part, as follo\vs : 
~'Any taxes, interest and costs paid more 
than once, or erroneously or illegally collected, 
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may, by order of the board of county eoinrnis-
sioners be refunded h~~ the county treasurer * * •' '. 
Plaintiff's application to the Board of County Commis-
~ioners of Iron (~ounty 'Yas denied on or about Septem-
ber 17~ 1959, on the ground said taxes had been lawfully 
as~e~~Pd, levied and collected. (R. 2) 
Follo,ving the refusal of Cedar City Corporation to 
n1ake reimburse1nent under the provision in the 'varranty 
deed, and the denial of plaintiff's application for a re-
fund by the Board of County Commissioners of Iron 
Count~·, plaintiff con1n1enced suit against both parties 
seeking relief against Iron County on the ground said 
taxes were erroneous 1~~ or illegally collected, and, in 
the alternative, against Cedar City Corporation on the 
ground said taxes 'vr re collected pursuant to la ,vful 
assessment and levy. 
ARGUMENT 
POIX11 I. 
THE PROPERTY TAXES PAID BY UTAH 
PARKS CO~fP AX\~ TO THE IRON COlTKTY 
TREASl-rRER ON THE EL ESCALANTE HO-
TEL AND UXDERLYING REAL~TY FOR THE 
\'"I1~AR 1958 \"VERE ERRONEOlTSL Y AND IL-
LEGALL )T COLLECTED AXD S I-I 0 TTL D 
THEREFORE BE REFUND,ED BY IRON 
COUNTY PlTRSlTANT TO SE·CTION 59-10-14, 
l ... TAH CODE .L\NXOTATED, 1953. 
In vie"T of the trial court's order granting Iron 
County's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, this 
court on rev-ie"~ is obliged to survey the allegations set 
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6 
forth therein in the light n1ost favorable to plaintiff 
and to indulge in its favor all reasonable inferences as 
to proof that may be adduced thereunder. It is the 
policy of this court to be reluctant to turn a party out 
of court 'vithout trial .and it can be done justifiably only 
if the party could not in any· event establish a right to 
recover. King Bros., Inc. rs. r~tah Dry Kt7n Company, 
________ l~ tah ( 2d) ________ , 37 -t- P. ( 2d) 25-1, ( 1962). 
Plaintiff's theory of an erroneous and illegal col-
lection by Iron County under the provisions of Section 
59-10-14, lTtah Code Annotated, 1953, is predicated upon 
the exen1ption status afforded C1edar ( 1ity Corporation 
by Article 13, Section 2, of the Constitution of l .... tah, 
upon all tangible property o\vned by the said Cedar 
City Corporation. 
That Section provides in part: 
"All tangible vroperty in the state, not ex-
en1pt under the la\\·8 of thP l;nited States, or under 
this constitution, ~hall be taxed in proportion to 
its value, to be a~rertained as provided by la,v. 
The property of the ~tate, counties, cities, to"~s. 
~ehool district~, n1unicipal corporations and pub-
lic libraries, lots 'Yi th building~ thereon used ex-
clusively for either religiou~ "Torship or charitable 
purposes, and plare~ of burial not held or used 
for privat<-~ or eorporate bPn~~fit, ~hall be exe1npt 
fron1 taxation." 
The exen1pt ~tatu~ of property <nYned by municipal 
corporations, or other puhlic entitie~, for the entire 
taxable year, is not que~tioned. ThP difficulty arises in 
this 0ase fro1n the faet that thP transfer of the property 
involved, fron1 a taxablP grantor to an exen1pt grantee, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
orenrred during· thP taxable year. ThP tax status of 
that property undPr ~urh a transf0r, i~ the real crux 
of this la"'"suit. 
Constitutional Pxernption from taxation as a basis 
for refund of taxes pajd to a county on a voluntary 
ba~i~, on the theory the c-ollection was illegal, is not 
unprecedented in this ~tate. The point 'va~ ruled upon 
in Neilson vs. Sa1lJJefr ( 1ounty, 40 Utah 560, 123 P. 334, 
(1912). There an action 'vas co1nmenced against Sanpete 
County to recover taxes 'vhich had been voluntarily paid, 
on the ground the assessinPnt, levy .and collection of the 
tax "'"as illegal and invalid. The tax was upon certain 
real Psta te mortgages for the years 1907, 1908 .and 1909. 
Prior to 1906 the legislature "'"as authorized by the State 
Constitution to provide for taxation of mortgages. How-
ever, in that ~ .. ear the Constitution 'vas amended to elim-
inate and exPmpt 1nortgages from taxation. The tax-
payer alleged that since the mortgages were exempt from 
taxation hy the State Constitution, the taxes assessed 
and levied thereon 'vere illegal and void. The Supreme 
Court agreed. It also held that the proper recourse for 
recover~~ was pursuant to the voluntary refund statute 
and that payment under protest was unnecessary. 
It seems ch•ar from the holding in the NeiJlson case 
that if pr-operty enjoys a tax exempt status during the 
entire taxable year, any attempt .at assessment, levy or 
collection of the tax thereon would be illegal and void, 
and that a refund from a Board of County Commission-
ers under the voluntary refund statute, upon proper 
demand therefor, would be mandatory. In this regard 
the only m1aterial variation between the Neilson case and 
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the present case is the fact that the exempt entity did 
not .acquire the property until January 31, 1958, one 
n1onth after January 1, 1958, the date upon which the 
County Assessor must assess all property subject to 
taxation to the person by 'vhom it is owned and at its 
value on that date (Section 59-5-+, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953), and one month after the inchoate tax lien had 
attached to S'aid property. (Section 59-10-3, Utah ·Code 
Annotated, 1953). Therefore, it must be determined 
whether the acquisition of title to the hotel property by 
Cedar City Corporation on January 31, 1958, \vould 
defeat the application of the l\r eilson holding, and pre-
vent plaintiff from making a recovery from Iron County. 
See also Wey vs. Salt Lake City, 35 l~tah 504, 101 P. 
381 (1909). 
There appears to be two arguments under Utah 
law for concluding that the collection of the tax in this 
case hy Iron County \v-as illegal and void and that a re-
fund fro1n the County should be allo\ved: 
( 1) T1he inchoate lien created by statute on J anu-
ary 1, 1958, at the time of assessment never matured 
into a valid and enforceable lien prior to acquisition of 
title to the property by the exempt grantee; 
( 2) The title to property transferred to an exempt 
entity in r;tah is subject to taxes onl~~ \Vhen said taxes 
have been both lawfully asses~ed and la,vfully levied 
ag-ainst th(l property prior to acquisition by tl1e exempt 
entity. 
Nu1nerous eas.es have held that the validity of an 
inchoate lien \vhich attached to property on a given date 
provided by statute is \Vholly dependent upon a sub-
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sequent lawful levy. ThP lien 1natures and becomes en-
forePable only after a la,vful lev~r on the theory of a 
rPlation back to the statutory lien date. Thus, by virtue 
of the propert~r pa~sing into tax exempt hands before the 
levr takes place, the attempted levy and subsequent col-
lPction, if any, of' the tax, haH no legal effect. It is 
eolnplPtel~r void. ~ o tax lien ever matures. This is 
bPeau~0 the crPation of a valid tax lien p-resupposes the 
existence of a susceptible subject of taxation at every 
~tage of the process of creation. 
The principle of relation back was applied and 
follo,Yed in G1~ll1uor 1)8. Dale, 27 Utah 372, 75 P. 932 
( 190-l-). In that case .action was commenced to recover 
taxe~ collected by the Treasurer of S:alt Lake County 
and paid to Salt Lake Cit~r Corporation. The property 
involved had be:en assessed pursuant to statute as of the 
first ~fonday in Fe·bruary and, also pursuant to statute, 
an inchoate lien attached at th.at time. On May 20, 1902, 
a portion of the territory of Salt Lake City was discon-
nected and discharged from payment of taxes to Salt 
L~ake City. Thereafter on July 28, 1902, the Salt Lake 
City Council levied a tax on the property owned by 
plaintiff ''-rhich 'Yas located in the disconnected .area. The 
Treasurer contended that the tax for 1902, although not 
levied until after the detachment of the territory from 
the City, ''"'as, nevertheless, a valid unpaid lien upon 
the property prior to detachment by virtue of the tax 
lien statutes. The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that 
by disconnection the property was no longer subject to 
a tax levy or any jurisdiction whatever by the City and 
the property involved never became subject to the tax 
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10 
lien contended for by the County Treasurer by virtue 
of the state taxation statutes. The court cites with ap-
proval the rule that no tax or assess1nent can exist so 
a.s to become a lien or encumbrance upon real property 
until the amount thereof is ascertained .and determined, 
and then states : 
''Under the provisions of the Revised Statutes 
a city tax does not become a lien on real estate 
until the rate thereof is fixed, and the tax levied, 
in pursuance of section~ 2:-~9, :2fj9-±; but \Yhen the 
rate is so fixed, the a1nount deter1nined and levied, 
a lien on each tract of real estate assessed by 
the assessor .attaches, by relation, for the amount 
of the tax thereon 'as of the first Monday of 
February' preceding the levy. (Citing cases). 
~·The ei ty council \vas not authorized, either 
under the Constitution or by the provisions of the 
Revised Statutes, to levy a tax, except on property 
\vithin its corporate lin1it~, and .any levy upon 
property not \Y"ithin such li1nits is \vithout author-
ity and void. As no lien can exist for taxes illeg-
ally· levied, the appellanfs (trea~urer's) conten-
tion in respect to the lien clain1ed in this ca8e is 
untenable." 
The relation bac:k }lrinciple \\-as al8o Inentioned in 
Anson rs. f}l!isou, 10-! taah 57ti~ 1-10 P. (:2d) 653 (19-i3). 
In that case .an action to quiet title to property \vas 
connnenced and Salt Lake Cit~~ \Va~ 1nad(• a party de-
fendant on the ground it clai1ned an interest in the 
propert~~ h~~ virtue of a ~pecial a8~es~1nent \Yhich it 
clai1ned constituted a lien on the property. 
()n thP principle of relation back, the court said: 
·· ... .a valid lien \\-ill not arise fron1 an invalid 
levy and assess1nent. ..Although it 1nay be that 
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11 
"·hen a tax is subsequently properly levied the 
lien 1nay relate back to the 1st day of January 
of the year in \vhich the proper levy should l1ave 
been ma(lP.'' 
A case si1nilar on its n1aterial facts to the one before 
u:-; on the question of relation back is State vs. Snoho1nish 
C ouu t.11, 71 \\T ash. 320, 128 P. 667 ( 191:2). In that case the 
State of vVashington COIIlmenced action to cancel tax 
eertificates and to quiet title to lands \vhich it had 
purchased fro1n private O\vners as a site for the \\T ash-
ington State Reformatory. A portion of the property 
,\.a8 vurchased on May 8, 1907, .and two other parcels on 
~\ugust 9, 1907. After purchase the Snohomish County 
Treasurer issued delinquency certificates for failure to 
pay the 1907 taxes in the name of the record o\vner as 
of ~larch 1, 1907. 
The State Constitution exempted .all property be-
longing to the State from taxation and the state statute 
establi~hing the tax lien provided that taxes assessed 
npon real property on I\I.arch 1st \vere a lien from that 
date until paid. The levy did not take place until after 
title to the property had passed to the State. The issue 
,,·as \\·hether real estate in private ownership on March 
1, 1907, but in public O\vnership \Vhen the taxes for that 
year \Vere levied, was subject to the payment of such 
taxes. 
The court held that the statute declaring taxes 
assessed upon real property \Vas a lien from ~Iarch 1st 
of the year in \vhich they are levied, makes the lien 
incipient and inchoate and becomes a mature and enforce-
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12 
able lien as of that date only by relation back upon the 
making of a valid levy. 
In support of its holding the court cites the Utah 
case of Gillmor vs. Dale, supra. The following language 
at :page 669, states the doctrine clearly: 
"Obviously the doctrine of relation presup-
poses a valid creation. It seems equally plain 
that the ereation of a valid tax in1plies the exis-
tence of a susceptible subject of taxation at every 
stage of the process of such creation. Since, on 
general principles of public policy and by both 
constitutional declaration and statutory enact-
ment, lands "rhile held in public ownership are 
exempt from taxation, the land here in question 
'vas not, during any step in the proceedings cre-
ating the tax after August 9, 1907, 'vhen it passed 
to the state, a susceptible subject of taxatioJL 
It follo,vs that at that time the developing process 
of imposing the tax as a valid creation was 
arrested. * * * 'Lands acquired for public pur-
poses during the period between the first and 
final steps of taxation are exempt fron1 taxes 
levied during the year in which they are acquired.' 
Territory of Arizona vs. Perrin, 9 Ariz. 316, 320, 
83 Par. 361, 362; United States v. Pierce County, 
supra; Bannon vs. Burnes, supra; Gilhnor vs. 
Dale, supra. 
H There is no dis tinction in this respect be-
t\\'een purrhases by the United States and pur-
chases by the state or a 1nunicipality for strictly 
public uses, as is sho,vn by the Louisiana .and Utah 
cases above cited. ''r e are constrained to hold 
that the statute (Retn. & Bal. Code Sec. 9235) 
creating the lien as to real property taxes makes 
the lien only incipient or inchoate on March 1st 
to become a complete and enforceable lien as of 
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that date by relation only upon the making of .a 
valid levy." 
In support of this view, see also City of Portland 
l'S. JlultHoJJutll County, 135 Or . .ffj9, 296 P. 48 (1931); 
City and County of Denver et al. vs. Tax Research 
l~ltreau, 101 Colo. 140, 71 P. (2d) 809 (1937) ~ City of 
Lanrel vs. W cems, 100 Miss. 335, 56 So. -!51 (1911); and 
Tlu£ted States rs. Certain Lands, 29 F. Sup·p. 92 (1939). 
In L' tah the Count~v _r\sse~sor must, before April 
15th of each year, assess all taxable p.roperty as of 
January 1st (Section 59-5-+, U.C.A., 1953) ~ the tax be-
comes a lien against the property assessed as of that 
day (Section 59-10-3, U.C.A., 1953); the county levy 
occurs bet,ve·en the last ~fonday in July and the second 
~[onday in August (Section 59-9-6, U.C.A., 1953); and 
thereafter the County Tre·asurer furnishes the taxpayer 
"~ith notice of the amount of tax assessed against him 
(Section 59-10-10, l:J.C.A., 1953). In this c.ase the title 
passed to Cedar City Corporation on Janua.ry 31, 1958, 
prior to the tax levy and prior to notice to the plaintiff 
of the amount of tax assessed against it. Under the 
prineiple of the G.illntor case, supra, no valid tax lien 
ever attached to the hotel property in 1958 and the levy 
upon the property and collection of the true by Iron 
County 'vas 'vithout authority, and, therefore, illegal and 
void. \Vith no basis to relate the inchoate lien back to 
.January 1st, the exempt status of the pToperty pre-
vailed for the entire year and the holding in the Neilson 
case, supra, would be applicable. 
In this case plaintiff did not pay the taxes under 
protest, pursuant to Section 59-11-11, Utah Code .. A.nno-
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tated, 1953. If payn1ent under protest was necessary 
under the facts of this case, plaintiff concedes that it 
has no remedy against Iron County. However, we be-
lieve the facts and circumstances of this case properly 
qualify it for a refund under the voluntary payment 
statute, Section 59-10-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Both provisions ·w·ere construed in detail in the 
t·l eilson c:ase, supra. After a lengthy analysis of the 
prope,r scope and application of each, the court concluded 
that taxes assessed and levied upon exempt property, 
even though in the regular manner, are absolutely illegal 
and void, and are properly recoverable by the taxpayer 
from the eounty pursuant to Section 59-10-14, U.C.A., 
1953. 
The question of """'hether special taxes assessed by 
a eity against exe1npt property 1nust be paid under pro-
test \Vas before the court in lf' ey vs. Salt Lake City, 35 
lT tah 504, 101 P. 381 ( 1901). In that case Salt L-ake 
City levied a spe:cial tax on lands abutting on a street 
to pay for the expense of paving and in1proving it. The 
B,oard of Education O\vned land abutting on the street 
and failed to pay the assess1nent. By statute all property 
o\vned by the Board "~as exe1npt fron1 special taxes. 
It later sold the property involved to the plaintiff "rho 
filed suit against Salt Lake Cit~~ to annul the assessment 
on the ground the property \Ya8 exempt fron1 the special 
tax. The trial court granted judgn1ent to the plaintiff 
.and on appeal the Supren1e Court affirn1ed. 
Among its defenses the eity urged that if the pro-
pert~~ \Ya8 exe1npt from the assess1nent, the Board~s 
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only remedy 'vas to pay the tax under protest and bring 
aetion for a recovery pursuant to "That is now Section 
10-7-39, lT. C1.A., 1953. rrhat p'rovision requires a tax-
payer a~sessed 'vi th a special tax by a city or to,vn to 
pa~r thP sa.Ine undPr protPst and file notice that he intends 
to ~ue to re'cover the pay1nent. It further provides that 
~uch re1nedy is exrlusive. The court, ho"\\'"ever, held that 
~uch statute had no application \vhere the p-roperty in-
volvPd 'vas exempt from the assessment. 
Under the Gillmor principle no valid tax lien ever 
attached to the property in the present case and, there-
fore, as .a 1natter of la.,v, it was not subject to taxation 
for the year 1958. The exempt nature of the grantee, 
\vho acquired the property after January 1st, but prior 
to the levy, impressed that property \vith con1plete tax 
in11nunity for the entire year and the collection thereof 
\Ya~ illegal and void. Therefore, this case falls within 
the holdings of the Neilson case and the W ey case as to 
the nature of plaintiff's claim against Iron County, and 
plaintiff is entitled to proceed against Iron County 
under the voluntary pa)rn1ent statute. See also W il :iOn 
rs. lVeber Couuty, 100 l~tah 141, 111 P. (2d) 147 (19-ll); 
and Shea vs. State Tax CoJJunission, 101 Utah 209, 120 P. 
(~d) 274 (1941). 
It i~ true that in the Gillnzor c.ase the taxes 'vere 
paid under protest. However, the issue of 'vhether or 
not thP suit could have been eommenced and recovery 
n1ade under the voluntary payment section 'vas never 
considered or ruled upon. That case, therefore, does 
not answer the question of 'vhether a recovery can be 
made for such taxes not paid under protest. 
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One final comment seems appropriate. The 'vord 
"may'' in Section 59-10-14, U.C.A., 1953, does not ~How 
a county commission any discretion in refunding taxes 
illegally colle·cted. The Neilson case, supra, holds that 
after a demand in 'vriting for the return of the tax 
has been made, and the county commission refuses to 
order a refund, the taxpayer may commence action to 
recover the tax together with legal interest from the 
date of the demand. The purpose of the '""ord "may" 
in the refund statute is to provide the county commission 
'vith an opportunity to refund the tax 'vithout the nec-
essity of court action by the taxpayer to enforce such 
a paynu:1nt. See also Wilson t;s. Weber County, supra 
(\'T olfe, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
POINT II. 
IX Ti fE AI~TERXATI,:--E TO POIXT I~ THE 
PROPERTY TAXES PAID BY UTAH P~.\RKS 
COl\lPANY TO THE IRON COUN"TY TREAS-
1 ~RER ON THE EL ESCAL~-\XTE HOTEL ~1\l"D 
UNDERL YIXG R-EALTY FOR THE l~EAR 
1958 \VERE LA \VFULL Y ASSESSED .A.XD 
LE\'IED, .A.KD T HE R E F 0 R E THERE 
SH01TLD BE A REil\IBl:R.SE~IEXT FRO~{ 
CEDAR ·CIT\~ CORPORATION PlTRSUAXT 
TO ITS LEGAL OBLIGATION UNDER THE 
\\-.-ARR.ANT1,. DEED. 
Plaintiff's theory against Cedar Cit~T Corporation 
is ba~ed upon the "rarra.nt~T deed covenant ""herein the 
grantPe agrePd to pay .all taxes la,vfully assessed or 
levied on the hotel property \vhieh becan1e subsequently 
due and payable. 
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If the Neilson and Gillnlor cases, supr:a, are con-
trolling in this la\vsuit, under the analysis heretofore 
presented for recovery against Iron County, there would 
be no lawful assessment or levy in this case, and no 
right of recovery fron1 Cedar City Corporation under 
the deed. Ho\vever, there is .a decision froin the United 
States Supreme Court which, if controlling, would appear 
to allo'v recovery from l~edar City Corporation. In 
[luited States rs. Alabama, 313 l~ .. s. 274, 85 L.Ed. 1327, 
61 Sup. Ct. 1011 (1941), the court held that the transfer 
of property fron1 a taxable grantor to the United Sta.tes 
following the tax day but prior to the day of levy did 
not transfer the title t:o the United Sitates free of the 
inchoate lien. In that case the U nit.ed States filed a 
suit to quiet title to certain property in Ala.b.ama. The 
state claimed that tax liens attached to said property 
on October 1, 1936, for state and county taxes for 1937. 
The l7nited States had obtained title to the three tracts 
of land involved on October 1, 1936, Dece1nber 10, 1936, 
and :Jlarch 10, 1937. In Alaba1na, fro1n and after October 
1st of each year property becomes assessable .and the 
state has an inchoate lien thereon for the pay1nent ·of 
all taxes until such taxes are paid. Thus the process of 
a.sses~nnent for 1937 com1nenced on October 1, 1936. 
The government claimed that the lands could not 
he taxed because when the l~nited States acquired title, 
the amount of taxes had not been ascertained as the 
values had not been assessed and the rate of taxation 
had not been fixed. It further claimed that the lien 
n1atured under such circumstances only when the taxes 
had been ascertained by completion of levy and assess-
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ment. The Supreme Court refused to accept this argu-
ment. Beginning at page 279 the court states: 
'"The~re is no question however, as the Gov-
ernment concedes, that the state statute purports 
to impose a lien as of October 1, 1936, for the 
taxes which by the process of assessment "Tere 
to become payable for the tax year 1937. October 
first is fixed as the tax day, and as of that day 
owners are to make their returns, values are to 
be fixed and the taxes laid. There is no question 
that tl1e State thus undertakes to create an in-
choate lien upon the lands as of the tax day, a 
lien \vhich is to be effective for the amount of 
the taxes for the ensuing year as these are fixed 
by the defined statutory method. This lien by the 
state la\v is made effective not only as against 
the owners on the tax day but also as against 
subsequent mortgagees and purchasers. * * * We 
find nothing in the Federal Constitution \vhich 
invalidates such a statutory schen1e. Subsequent 
lienors and purchasers have due notice of the tax 
liability imposed as of the tax day and of the pro-
cess of assess1nent, and that liability, when its 
a1nount is definitely ascertained, relates back 
to the day specified.'' 
The court continues on page ~81, .a~ follo\\TS: 
"* * * The Governn1ent brings this suit in 
the vie"'" that it is entitled to have a 1narketable 
title and it seeks to ren1ove the liens in question 
as clouds upon that title \Vhich would interfere 
\Yi th the disposition of thP lands in the future. 
From that standpoint the Government as~ks .a 
decree declaring the invalidity of the liens and 
enjoining the State fro1n asserting any claim in 
the lands either adverse to the United States or 
to its successors in title. We think that the 
lTnited States is not entitled to that relief. The 
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LTnited States took the eonveyance with kno\vl-
edge of the state law fixing the lien a.s of October 
1st. That la\v in creating such liens for the taxes 
~ubsPquently assessed in due course and making 
the1n effective as against subsequent purchasers 
did not contravene the Constitution of the United 
~·Hates and we perceive no reason \vhy the United 
States, albeit protected \vith respect to proceed-
ings ag.ainst it without its consent, should stand, 
so far a.s the existence of the liens is concerned, 
in any different position from that 'Of other pur-
chasers of lands in Alabama \vho take convey-
ances on and .after tl1e specified tax date. It is 
familiar practice for grantees who take title in 
sue] 1 circumstances to see t1hat provision is made 
f·or the payment of taxes and the GoveTninent 
could e:asily have protected itself in like 1nanner. 
Finding no constitutional infirmity in the state 
legislation, we think that the liens should be held 
valid." 
Cedar City Corporation acquired title to the prop-
erty involved herP \vith the san1e notice and kno\vledge 
the l .... nited State~ had in the AlalJanza ease ,,~ith respect 
to the tax day. Both \Vere a\vare of the statutory pro-
vi~ion~ "\Yhich i1nposed an inchoate lien on all taxable 
propert~T on Raid day and that the taxing authority, if 
not legally restricted fro1n doing so, would, in due course, 
perfect the lien through subsequent levy, and when 
ascertained "\\Tould relate the liability bac~k to the tax day. 
The scope of constitutional exen1ption of property 
from taxation in this state, \Vhere ae<1nisition is n1ade 
by a public entity during the ta:xahle year, has never 
been con1pletely defined. l~ nder the rationale of the 
(lilhnor case, supra, it appears that the critical point 
in the taxing process is the date of levy, and that if an 
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exempt entity acquires the property before that date the 
taxing process is stopped~ however, if it acquires the 
property subsequent to that date the tax lien survives 
the transfer. Nevertheless, in Gillnlor the power to tax 
\Yas lost be~ause the property \vas disconnected from 
the territory of the taxing power, not because it \Vas 
acquired by the state or one of its political subdivisions. 
In addition, neither that case nor -any other l;tah case 
to our kno\vledge, has considered the effect of statutory 
notice to an exempt grantee, upon its acquisition of 
pr·operty fro1n a taxable grantor during the taxable 
year, of an inchoate lien impressed on said property 
by the tax day provision. Such kno\\'ledge on the part 
of the lTnited States \vas the primary reason for the 
holding in the Alaba1na decision, supra. In our Yiev{, 
the Supren1e Court's analysis in that case deserves con-
sideration here. 
The lTtah Supreme Court recognized that there are 
liinitations 'On tl1e scope of constitutional tax imn1unity 
for public entities in State rs. Salt Lnke Co·unty, 96 
lTtah 464, 85 P. (2d) 851 (1938). There the county bid 
in certain property for delinquent taxes during the time 
''"·hen the property \Vas mortgaged to the state. After 
the final tax sale, the state acquired title by a "!"arranty 
deed front the Inortgagor and thereafter com1nenced 
quiet title procPedings against the county. The eourt 
held that tl1e tax lien survived the arquisition of title 
by the state and the state'~ constitutional exen1ption from 
taxation \Vould not apply. One issue presented \Yas 
\vhether the c.onstitutional exemption of state property 
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from taxation could be made to cover property \\~hich 
'\vas in private o'\vnership at the tin1e it was assessed 
f·or taxation, the tax levied, the tax lien attached and 
the property sold for unpaid taxes. Under these cir-
euJnHtances the court concluded that the state acquired 
only the ti tie that its grantor had at the ti1ne of transfer 
by deed, .and this was a title encumbered by· taxes there-
tofore lawfully assessed and levied against the property. 
To hold otherwise '\vould constitute abatement of taxes, 
not exernption of taxes. 
~0e also State vs. Duchesne County, 96 l7tah 482, 
~5 P. (2d) 860 (1938), and the annotation in 158 ALR 
beginning at p.age 563. 
\Vhile the facts in the s.alt Lake County case, supra, 
are readily distinguishable from those present here, and 
the court speaks of the levy as the critical date for 
p:..;tabli~hing a valid lien, the case does illustrate that 
constitutional ta..x immunity for public entities i:--; not 
absolute for .all acquisitions, and that unless property 
~~ rlearl~T exempt it cannot escape the burden of taxation. 
It also clearly sets forth the requiren1ent of strict con-
~truction against exemptions of property from taxation 
under the lTtah Constitution .and that all doubts must 
be resolved against the exemption. lTnder such circum-
stances, and even though the present l!tah la'v appears 
contrary, the ratronale of the Alabanz.a case has been 
presented in this la,Ysuit. It would appear that the 
application of that decision 'vould 1nake the entire tax-
ing process in this case legal in all respects. In that 
event that collection of the tax by the County 'vould 
be lawful under a valid levy and as~essn1ent, and a re-
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covery under the vvarranty deed from Cedar City Cor-
poration \vould be proper. 
It is true th.a.t there is no provision in the warranty 
deed \vherein Cedar (~ity Corporation explicitly agrees 
to reimburse plaintiff for taxes pai~d to Iron County. 
Neither is there a provision in t~he deed expressly re-
quiring Cedar City to pay the taxes directly to Iron 
County. The deed me~rely requires the City to assume 
and pay s.aid taxes. The means of pay1nent are not 
spelled out. Therefore, if the taxes on the hotel "~ere 
la,,~fully assessed and lawfully levied, elements Vi,,.hich are 
indispensable for plaintiff to recover fro1n Cedar City 
Corporation, then the payment by plaintiff to Iron 
County and reimbursement from Cedar ·City, or in the 
alternative, a direct pay1nent to the Colmty by Cedar 
City, vvould both constitute performance of the clear 
jntention of the parties to the deed. 
And, if Cedar (ii t:~ had refused to pay the tax, plain-
tiff, as record O\\'"Iler on J·anuary 1, 1958, \Vas under 
somP risk in not doing so by virtue of Section 59-5-12, 
U.C.A., 1953, \Yhich provides that \vhere the name of 
the O\Yner of .any property is kno\Yn, or appears of record, 
it n1ust be assessed to such name, and .also by Yirtue of 
Section 59-10-1, U.C.A., 1953, \\'"hich provides that every 
tax has the effert of a judg1nent against the person, 
and PVPr:'" lien created thereby has the force and effect 
of .an execution duly leYied again~t all personal property 
of the delinquent. See also the concurring opinion in 
!I ayes vs. Gibbs, 110 1 Ttah 54, 169 P. (2d) 781, 788 (1946), 
where Justice Wolfe points out th~at Section 59-10-1 
see1n~ to make the tax a debt against the individual 
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o'vning the property and a lien on his personal property 
rather than a charge against the property alone. 
T'he possible legal effect of the foregoing statutory 
provisions, together 'vith plaintiff's contractual rights 
,vith Cedar City Corporation under the deed, provide it 
'vith ample basis for paying the tax and then securing 
reimbursemPnt for the taxes so paid. See Franklh1 Bwild-
ing & Loan Co. vs. Peppard, 97 Utah 483, 93 P. (2cl) 
92;) ( 1939). 
\Ve recognize that Cedar City Corporation's o'vner-
~hip of property is all that is necessary to remove it 
from a taxable status even though the City may use the 
property in a nongovernmental capacity such as oper-
ating a hotel. Spr~ngville vs. Jensen, 10 Utah 351, 37 P. 
577 (1894), and Duchesne vs. State Tax Contmissi,on, 
104 L"tah 365, 1-tO P. (2d) 335 (1943). Therefore, plain-
tiff n1akes no attempt to recover from Cedar City on the 
nature of the use to which it has put the property in-
volved. 
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The holdings of this court in Neilson and Gillmor, 
supra, may well be dispositive on the question of the 
leg.ali ty of the taxes involved in this case. In that event 
plaintiff's remedy is against Iron County. However if 
the levy and lien are valid against the prop~erty involved 
in this ease for the year 1958 regardless of the transfer 
to an exempt grantee, under the views expressed in the 
Alabarn~a case, supra., it is our contention that Cedar 
City Corporation should be required to live up to its 
covenant under the deed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRlTAN P. LE,TERICH 
A. l~. ~fiXER 
HO\\"'"ARD F. CORAY 
SCOTT l\I. :JIATHESOX 
GARY L. THEl~RER 
40-! Union Pacific Building 
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